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Positive Test Results for Acute Hepatitis A Virus Infection Among Persons With No Recent History of Acute Hepatitis -United States, 2002-2004
Hepatitis A is a nationally reportable condition, and the surveillance case definition* includes both clinical criteria and serologic confirmation (1) . State health departments and CDC have investigated persons with positive serologic tests for acute hepatitis A virus (HAV) infection (i.e., IgM anti-HAV) whose illness was not consistent with the clinical criteria of the hepatitis A case definition. Test results indicating acute HAV infection among persons who do not have clinical or epidemiologic features consistent with hepatitis A are a concern for state and local health departments because of the need to assess whether contacts need postexposure immunoprophylaxis. This report summarizes results of three such investigations, which suggested that most of the positive tests did not represent recent acute HAV infections. To improve the predictive value of a positive IgM anti-HAV test, clinicians should limit laboratory testing for acute HAV infection to persons with clinical findings typical of hepatitis A or to persons who have been exposed to settings where HAV transmission is suspected.
Connecticut
The Connecticut Department of Public Health investigated 127 IgM anti-HAV positive test results reported during January 2002-April 2003 via telephone interviews conducted with patients and health-care providers; 108 persons had illness consistent with the clinical and laboratory criteria of the CDC case definition for acute hepatitis A. The median age among these 108 persons was 41 years (range: 6-86 years); 60 (56%) were males. Among 19 persons who had illness that did not meet the case definition for hepatitis A, median age was 48 years (range: 28-88 years); 10 (53%) were females. None of the 19 persons reported recent exposure to a person with hepatitis A, and all either were asymptomatic (nine patients) or had a clinical presentation that was not consistent with hepatitis A (10). Three had elevated ALT concentrations (range: 61-300 units per liter [U/L]. Serologic testing for these persons was performed at one of eight clinical laboratories by using one of three licensed IgM anti-HAV test kits. No single brand of testing kit or lot number was used for all the tests. Three of the 19 persons had a previously reported positive IgM anti-HAV test result 4-59 months before the most recently reported test and did not have illness that met the case definition at the time of the previous report. Two patients had no record of having the test ordered, and the reason for testing was unknown for the remaining 17 patients.
Alaska
A total of 27 cases of hepatitis A that were consistent with the CDC case definition were reported to the Alaska Division of Public Health during [2002] [2003] [2004] . Medical records of 10 additional persons who had positive tests for IgM anti-HAV reported but did not have illness consistent with the hepatitis sole source of the report for 50 (57%) of these persons, compared with 23 (43%) of those whose illness met the case definition (p<0.05).
The 87 persons who did not have illness meeting the hepatitis A case definition were significantly older and more likely to be female (p<0.05), compared with persons whose illness was consistent with the case definition (Table) . As expected, fewer persons who did not have illness meeting the case definition had discrete onset of symptoms or laboratory evidence of liver injury; however, because these criteria are included in the case definition for hepatitis A, tests of statistical significance for differences between the two groups were not performed. Of these 87 persons, 31 (36%) had sera available for repeat serologic testing at CDC. Of these 31 persons, two (6%) tested positive for IgM anti-HAV. One of 14 with ALT above the upper limit of normal (i.e., 30-50 U/L, depending on the clinical laboratory) was IgM anti-HAV positive on repeat testing.
Of 25 specimens available from persons with no symptoms of HAV infection for HAV nucleic acid detection and sequence analysis, one (4%) specimen from a man aged 77 years had detectable HAV RNA, compared with 34 (66%) of 51 specimens from persons with both clinical and laboratory evidence of hepatitis A. On repeat testing of the same specimen, the man tested IgM anti-HAV negative. No hepatitis A cases were reported among contacts of persons whose illness did not meet the case definition. ; however, this report is the first to describe the clinical and epidemiologic characteristics of these persons. Findings in this report indicate that persons who are unlikely to have acute viral hepatitis should not be tested for IgM anti-HAV and that the use of IgM anti-HAV as a screening tool or as part of testing panels used in the workup of nonacute liver function abnormalities should be discouraged. Health departments should continue to apply clinical criteria in the case definition when conducting hepatitis A surveillance and determining whether postexposure immunoprophylaxis is needed for contacts. Postexposure immunoprophylaxis for contacts is unlikely to be indicated for persons whose illness does not meet the case definition, unless recent exposure to a person with acute HAV infection has occurred.
A positive IgM anti-HAV test result in a person without typical symptoms of hepatitis A might indicate asymptomatic acute HAV infection, previous HAV infection with prolonged presence of IgM anti-HAV, or a false-positive test result. HAV infection can manifest a broad clinical spectrum, ranging from asymptomatic infection to typical hepatitis with fever and jaundice. Although an estimated 70% of children aged <6 years with HAV infection are asymptomatic, older children and adults usually have symptoms, and 70% are jaundiced (3, 4) . Studies conducted during hepatitis A outbreaks or among family members exposed to HAV indicate that HAV infection can cause asymptomatic infection with or without abnormal liver tests, primarily among young children (5) .
In Connecticut and Alaska, four persons had previously been reported with IgM anti-HAV positive test results. A prolonged presence of IgM anti-HAV after acute hepatitis A has been reported previously. In one study, IgM anti-HAV was observed in eight (14%) of 59 persons with hepatitis A for >200 days after onset (6); another study revealed that two of 15 patients with hepatitis A had detectable IgM anti-HAV >30 months after onset (7) .
HAV RNA can be detected for a mean of 79 days after the peak ALT and remains detectable in 40% of persons with acute Although a prolonged positive test after a recent acute infection is a possible explanation for some persons with positive IgM anti-HAV but no recent signs or symptoms of hepatitis, most persons with positive anti-HAV test results in Connecticut, Alaska, and the Sentinel Counties Study were older adults without typical risk for infection, and most who were retested were determined to be IgM anti-HAV negative. None were reported to have transmitted infection to others. These data suggest that IgM anti-HAV positive tests in older persons without typical symptoms of hepatitis are more likely 1) false-positive test results or 2) the result of HAV infection that occurred months to years previously, rather than more recent HAV infection, which requires consideration of postexposure immunoprophylaxis for contacts.
Testing of persons with no clinical symptoms of acute viral hepatitis, and among populations with a low prevalence of acute HAV infection, lowers the predictive value of the IgM anti-HAV test. Diagnostic tests for viral hepatitis, including licensed IgM anti-HAV tests, are highly sensitive and specific when used on specimens from persons with acute hepatitis. However, their use among persons without symptoms of hepatitis A can lead to IgM anti-HAV test results that are false positive for acute HAV infection or of no clinical importance. This might be occurring with use of laboratory test panels that include routine testing for IgM anti-HAV without requiring a specific order for the test (i.e., "reflex testing") among persons who are not being evaluated for possible acute hepatitis (e.g., persons with liver function test abnormalities or persons being screened for hepatitis C).
The findings in this report are subject to at least two limitations. First, serum specimens from patients in Connecticut or Alaska who did not have illness meeting the case definition were not available for additional testing, and specimens were available from only 31 of 87 patients identified in the Sentinel Counties Study. Second, the reason for IgM anti-HAV testing for most patients whose illness did not meet the case definition was not available.
Providing immune globulin is not recommended for contacts of IgM anti-HAV positive persons when the date that these persons might have been infectious is unknown (because no defined symptom onset is known), even for those patients who repeatedly test IgM anti-HAV positive. Clinicians and public health officials who receive reports of persons who are IgM anti-HAV positive in the absence of symptoms of viral hepatitis or history of recent contact with a hepatitis A patient should consider seeking additional information when making decisions about the need for postexposure immunoprophylaxis among contacts. Acute HAV infection is unlikely in persons who have received 1 or more doses of hepatitis A vaccine >1 month before symptom onset (3) . Testing the patient for total anti-HAV and retesting for IgM anti-HAV might be helpful. Persons with acute HAV infection will test total anti-HAV positive; if the total anti-HAV test is negative, acute HAV infection is unlikely. Retesting the same or another serum specimen, preferably by using a different test format, might indicate that the person is IgM anti-HAV negative.
Published guidelines for the workup of abnormal liver enzyme tests among asymptomatic patients do not include IgM anti-HAV testing (9) . Health-care providers should limit use of IgM anti-HAV testing to persons with evidence of clinical hepatitis or to those who have had recent exposure to an HAV-infected person. Persons who are IgM anti-HAV positive but who do not have illness consistent with the case definition for hepatitis A should not be reported to CDC.
In November 2001, the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) conducted a survey of state and territorial health departments to assess their core epidemiologic capacity (1, 2) . The survey was completed just before distribution of approximately $1 billion in terrorism preparedness and emergency response funds in fiscal year 2002, intended to improve the U.S. public health infrastructure (3) . Results of the 2001 survey, published in 2003, indicated inadequate capacity in six of eight key epidemiology program areas (all except infectious disease and chronic disease) to fully perform the essential public health services most dependent on epidemiology (1, 4) . In 2004, CSTE conducted a follow-up survey that assessed epidemiologic capacity in the United States and its territories in the same eight program areas, estimated the number of additional epidemiologists needed for full performance, and identified education and training needs (5) . This report summarizes the results of that 2004 follow-up survey, which indicated a 26.9% increase* from 2001 in the overall number of epidemiologists working in state and territorial health departments, increased capacity in two program areas (i.e., terrorism preparedness and emergency response; maternal and child health) and decreased capacity in six other program areas (i.e., infectious disease, chronic disease, environmental health, injury, occupational health, and oral health) (2) . Results also revealed that 28.5% of epidemiologists lacked any formal training or academic coursework in epidemiology. Creation of a strong public health infrastructure fully capable of performing essential services will require additional trained epidemiologists in state and territorial health departments.
The Participants were asked to assess epidemiologic and surveillance capacity in eight key program areas by using a six-point scale, which was converted to the four-point scale § used in the 2001 assessment to enable comparison. Participants reported increased capacity from 2001 to 2004 in two program areas (i.e., terrorism preparedness and emergency response and † The definition of epidemiologist was from A Dictionary of Epidemiology (6) .
For the 2004 CSTE survey, epidemiologists in state and territorial health departments were defined as any persons who performed functions consistent with this definition, regardless of job title. § The six-point scale was as follows: Full = 100%, almost full = 75%-99%, substantial = 50%-74%, partial = 25%-49%, minimal = <25%, and none = 0. The four-point scale was as follows: Full/almost full = 75%-100%, substantial = 50%-74%, partial = 25%-49%, and minimal or no capacity = <25%. maternal and child health) and decreased capacity in six other program areas (i.e., infectious disease, chronic disease, environmental health, injury, occupational health, and oral health) ( Figure) . The majority of state and territorial health departments reported full, almost full, or substantial capacity in only two program areas, infectious disease and terrorism preparedness and emergency response.
In addition, respondents were asked to self-assess their abilities to provide the essential public health services most dependent on epidemiology (1, 4) . Among the 50 states, 31 (62.0%) reported having substantial-to-full capacity to monitor health status and solve community health problems, and 29 (58.0%) reported substantial-to-full capacity in diagnosing and investigating health problems and health hazards in the community. In contrast, 11 states (22.0%) reported having substantial-to-full capacity in evaluating effectiveness, accessibility, and quality of personal and population-based health services, and six states (12.0%) reported substantial-to-full capacity in researching for new insights and innovative solutions to health problems.
The largest percentage of epidemiologists working in state and territorial health departments had master's degrees (41.8%), followed by doctoral degrees (25.6%), bachelor's degrees (23.2%), and associate degrees or high school diplomas (5.0%) (Table) . Information on epidemiology training was obtained for 1,897 (73.5%) of the 2,580 epidemiologists. Of these 1,897, a total of 986 (51.9%) had degrees in epidemiology, and 369 (19.4%) had completed other formal training or academic coursework in epidemiology; 541 (28.5%) had no formal training or academic coursework in epidemiology. Editorial Note: The influx of approximately $1 billion in terrorism preparedness and emergency response funds substantially strengthened the epidemiologic capabilities of the public health structure in the United States. However, despite this increased funding, state and territorial health departments report that a 47% increase in the number of epidemiologists is needed to fully perform the nation's essential public health services most dependent on epidemiology. needed for their departments to perform essential public health services and to estimate epidemiologic capacity likely varied.
In 1988, and again in 2002, the Institute of Medicine recommended that every public health department regularly and systematically collect, assemble, analyze, and make available information regarding the health of the community, including statistics on health status, community health needs, and epidemiologic and other studies of health problems (7, 8) . The threat of terrorism renewed calls for strengthening the public health infrastructure. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has emphasized the need for a closely linked, nationwide public health network of local, regional, and state health resources (4) . Epidemiologists in state and territorial health departments are essential to the monitoring of chronic conditions and diseases and the rapid detection and reporting of infectious disease outbreaks, whether or not related to terrorism. New and better means for estimating the epidemiologic capacity needs and measuring the performance of state and territorial health departments should continue to be created. CDC and CSTE are in the process of defining core competencies for epidemiologists, which should facilitate staffing and development of training. In the meantime, the findings from the 2004 epidemiologic capacity survey, with the limitations noted, can serve as a useful baseline for future epidemiologic assessments.
Brief Report

Terrorism and Emergency Preparedness in State and Territorial Public Health Departments -United States, 2004
After the events of September 11, 2001, federal funding for state public health preparedness programs increased from $67 million in fiscal year (FY) 2001 to approximately $1 billion in FY 2002. These funds were intended to support preparedness for and response to terrorism, infectious disease outbreaks, and other public health threats and emergencies (1) (3, 4) . Adjusting the data to reflect only DC and the 38 states that provided information for both surveys, the number of epidemiologists working in terrorism preparedness increased 103%, from 115 epidemiologists in 2001 to 234 in 2004.
Of the 424 epidemiologists working in terrorism preparedness programs, 39% (167) had a master's degree, 29% (124) had doctoral degrees, 26% (108) had bachelor's degrees, and 6% (25) had associate degrees or high school diplomas. Information on formal training in epidemiology was obtained for 67% (283 of 424) of the epidemiologists working in terrorism preparedness: 64% (180) had a degree in epidemiology, 16% (46) had completed other formal training or had academic coursework in epidemiology, and 20% (58) had no formal training or academic course work in epidemiology. Terrorism preparedness programs had one of the highest concentrations of personnel with degrees in epidemiology, compared with programs in occupational health, 64% (29 of 45); environmental health, 61% (117 of 193); chronic diseases, 58% (182 of 313); maternal and child health, 53% (121 of 227); oral health, 48% (10 of 21); injury, 44% (26 of 59); and infectious disease, 43% (314 of 732).
As of September 2004, federally appropriated terrorism preparedness funds paid the salaries of 460 epidemiologists working in several program areas: 53% (243) worked in terrorism and emergency preparedness, 33% (153) in infectious diseases, 5% (24) in environmental health, and 9% (39) in chronic disease, injury, maternal and child health, occupational health, and other relevant program areas. Among the 390 epidemiologists working in terrorism and emergency preparedness, 62% were paid with federal terrorism preparedness funds (Table) , whereas 38% were paid with state or other funds. Although an overall increase in the number of infectious disease epidemiologists did not occur from 2001 to 2004, nearly 20% were paid with federal terrorism preparedness funds.
The increase in state public health capacity reflects the substantial investment in efforts to support state terrorism preparedness programs and the corresponding public health infrastructure. Despite progress in this effort, state public health officials estimate that 192 additional epidemiologists, an increase of 45.3%, are needed nationwide in terrorism preparedness programs and that essential services provided by these epidemiologists need continued improvement to reach full capacity (4) . The findings in this report suggest that the efforts of states to meet federal terrorism preparedness program requirements have redirected state resources from other program areas. CSTE recommends that dual use of terrorism and emergency preparedness epidemiology resources should be substantially expanded to realign functional roles and build overall capacity of state health departments to prepare for and respond to terrorism, infectious disease outbreaks, and other public health threats and emergencies. (2) .
The assessment tool includes 79 questions and approximately 700 subquestions. Thirty additional questions were added to target Kansas-specific preparedness capacities not fully addressed by the assessment tool (e.g., adoption of Kansasspecific disease intervention protocols or computer security standard procedures). The printed questionnaire was converted to electronic form to support data submission from LHDs via a secure, Internet-based, communication system. Answers were submitted electronically during the second half of 2002 and the second half of 2003, leaving approximately 1 year between the two assessments. LHDs representing 103 of 105 (98%) Kansas counties (i.e., one LHD per county) responded to both surveys.
Most questions in the assessment tool have a limited number of multiple-choice answers and are qualitative in nature; for example, respondents were asked to specify the extent to which a certain activity had been completed. To calculate measures of LHD capacity, the KHI project team, in consultation with representatives from LHDs, developed a method for aggregating responses from multiple questions into summary scores. Each question was assigned to one or more of the 15 critical capacities. Representatives from KALHD and KHI developed a method for converting responses to each survey question to dichotomous, "achieved" or "not achieved" classifications. These criteria were included in a computerized algorithm used to analyze all the answers from all LHDs. Through the computerized analysis, a preparedness index was calculated for each LHD for every critical capacity. FA preparedness indexes were computed by calculating the unweighted average of the critical capacities indexes included in that FA. Finally, an overall, county-level preparedness capacity index was computed as the average of the indexes for all the FAs for each LHD.
To summarize local preparedness capacity in Kansas, state averages of the critical capacities and FAs indexes were computed as the unweighted averages of the corresponding countylevel indexes. State overall preparedness indexes were calculated as the average of all county overall preparedness indexes.
From 2002 to 2003, a total of 89 (86.4%) of the 103 participating counties improved their county preparedness capacity indexes (median change = 27%). The state average for the overall local preparedness capacity index increased by 27.7%, from 33.9% to 43.3%. Improvement was observed for each FA index, with the largest increase (48.3%) in FA G (education and training) and the smallest (10.4%) in FA C (laboratory capacity) (Table) . * Questions added to the CDC assessment tool to address interests specific to Kansas (e.g., adoption of Kansas-specific disease intervention protocols or computer security standard procedures).
Substantial differences were observed in county preparedness capacity indexes; in 2003, indexes ranged from 17.3% to 75.5% (median = 42%). Rural areas lagged in preparedness improvement. In 2003, the 33 counties in the lowest population density group achieved an average preparedness index capacity of 38%, in contrast with the average index of 56% achieved by the six urban counties in the highest population density group. From 2002 to 2003, this gap appeared to widen; the ratio of the mean preparedness index for urban and rural counties increased from 1.3 to 1.5. Editorial Note: Approximately $2 billion was distributed to state and local governments during 2002-2003 to improve public health capacity for terrorism preparedness and emergency response. The findings in this report suggest that this investment has resulted in measurable improvement of preparedness capacity in the majority of counties in Kansas. These achievements, however, should be balanced with the finding that state overall preparedness is only 43.3%, and disparities persist among different areas of the state. Rural areas are experiencing difficulty improving their preparedness levels, and many FA and critical capacity scores remain low.
The findings in this report are subject to at least four limitations. First, the CDC assessment tool was designed to measure preparedness capacity in health departments nationwide serving various types and sizes of jurisdictions; in certain instances, inventory questions might not have been directly applicable to the responsibilities, needs, and capacities of LHDs in Kansas, especially for parts of FA C (laboratory capacity) and E (communication and information technology). Second, all information analyzed was self-reported, and no answer validation or verification occurred. However, the assessment tool has been validated elsewhere (2) , and nearly all the observed changes point consistently to an increase in the preparedness capacity index scores, with few internal inconsistencies in the survey results. Third, no accepted standards exist for what constitutes adequate preparedness for LHDs. The preparedness capacity indexes and thresholds used in this study were created by local officials and are among the first such measures to be used to assess terrorism preparedness at the local level. Although the use of these indexes allows easy comparisons between the 2002 and the 2003 surveys and among groups of respondents, the criteria used to compute the indexes are arbitrary. The adoption of different criteria, or the movement up or down of the achievement thresholds for individual questions, could produce different results. Finally, all indexes were computed by using unweighted means, and because the number of elements that compose each index varies, single responses might affect summary indexes disproportionately.
While determining the optimal level of preparedness capacity for LHDs in Kansas was not an objective of this study, the findings suggest that when attention and funds are allocated, preparedness capacity improves in specific and measurable ways. Investments in such a critical field as public health preparedness should be accompanied by consistent evaluation methods. For this purpose, CDC is shifting attention from assessment of public health capacity to evaluation of actual public health performance that can be expected as a result of the increased capacity. These findings also demonstrate that when the same measurable indicators are used repeatedly, important information can be obtained regarding successes and areas in need of further improvement. Notice to Readers
QuickStats
Publication of Guidance on Public Reporting of Healthcare-Associated Infections
In U.S. hospitals alone, health-care-associated infections (HAIs) account for an estimated 2 million infections, 88,000 deaths, and $4.5 billion dollars in excess health-care costs annually (1). Increasingly, consumers are requesting public release of information such as HAI rates to enable them to make more informed health-care choices. Several states have initiated legislative efforts that will mandate hospitals and other health-care organizations to publicly report HAI rates.
The Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC) has developed a guidance document on public reporting of HAIs to assist policymakers, program planners, consumer advocacy organizations, and others who will be tasked with designing and implementing such reporting systems. The document, Guidance on Public Reporting of Healthcare-Associated Infections: Recommendations of the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee, provides a framework for an HAI reporting system and recommendations for process and outcome measures to be included in the system; the document does not provide model legislation (2). These recommendations have been endorsed by the Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology, the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists, and the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America.
Notice to Readers
Hepatitis Awareness Month -May 2005
May is Hepatitis Awareness Month. In 2003, in the United States, an estimated 61,000 new infections occurred with hepatitis A virus, 73,000 with hepatitis B virus, and 30,000 with hepatitis C virus (1) . Effective interventions, such as hepatitis A and hepatitis B immunization (2,3) and counseling and testing for hepatitis C (4), can help prevent and control viral hepatitis and protect personal and community health. Additional information regarding Hepatitis Awareness Month, activities associated with this month, prevention and control of viral hepatitis, and free educational materials is available at http://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis. -75  140  559  336  Calif.  21  26  ----670  601  9,570  9,961  Alaska  3  1  ----23  25  168  249  Hawaii  3  3  ----22  30  301  496   Guam  N  N  -------63  P.R.  ------10  17  132  78  V.I. - - PACIFIC  114  161  1  -5  3  --108  158  Wash.  20  10  1  -4  3  --15  7  Oreg.  23  32  ------23  32  Calif.  63  112  ------63  112  Alaska  2 
